23 July=20 2005

H5N1 Lab Research at CDC: Important Science, Predictable = Accusations

In the=20 May 26, 2005 issue of Nature focusing on H5N1 avian influenza and = an=20 article on biosafety of lab work with 1918-like influenza viruses in=20 Science (2004;306:591) reference was made to laboratory research = at the=20 US CDC with the avian = H5N1 virus to=20 understand how it could = mutate or=20 form a novel reassortment virus by interacting with human influenza = viruses to=20 cause sustained human-to-human transmission and trigger a pandemic.=20

According=20 to the article in Nature, this work is being done in the CDC = (Atlanta)=20 influenza labs under the senior =20 leadership of Dr. = Nancy Cox.=20 Initial experiments are reported to focus on H5N1 avian influenza virus=20 interactions in cell cultures with human influenza viruses. In the = autumn of=20 2005 this work may be extended to involve infection of animals with one = or more=20 of these influenza viruses. Similar laboratory work with H5N1 is = anticipated to=20 begin soon in Europe at another renowned influenza laboratory. This H5N1 = research at the US CDC and in Europe has the approval of the World = Health=20 Organization.

From a=20 scientific perspective this lab research on H5N1 may well prove crucial = to=20 mitigate the coming influenza pandemic and accelerate development of=20 countermeasures such as vaccines against the pandemic influenza strain.=20

At the=20 same time, however, the US should anticipate the predictable perception = that if=20 a pandemic does occur with an H5N1 pandemic-precursor virus, then an = accusation=20 will be forthcoming from some quarters that the pandemic virus = originated in a=20 US laboratory. Precedents for such accusations exist. Examples of such precedents = include the=20 implausible and unproven =20 accusations that the US =20 engineered and released pathogens include HIV, the SARS = coronavirus, and the plague bacteria that = caused the=20 outbreak in India in 1994. =20

Concern=20 that biosafety is optimized for lab experiments involving any dangerous=20 pathogens, such as H5N1 influenza, smallpox (variola virus), the = 1918-like=20 influenza virus, hemorrhagic fever viruses, and others is = understandable,=20 appropriate, and recognized daily by researchers worldwide. Nevetheless, = given=20 that the next influenza pandemic could occur related to the = unprecedented=20 situation of H5N1 virus becoming endemic in animal populations in Asia, = then the=20 predictable perception should be anticipated and defended against that=20 laboratories working with the H5N1 virus now may well be accused of = being the=20 source of the very pandemic that they are working to mitigate, if not = entirely=20 prevent.

Daniel=20 R.Lucey , MD, MPH

Director,=20 Center for Biologic Counterterrorism and Emerging = Diseases

Department=20 of Emergency Medicine, Washington Hospital Center

Adjunct=20 Professor of Microbiology = and=20 Immunology

Georgetown=20 University School of Medicine, =20 Washington, DC = &nbs= p; =20 =20 =20